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Abstract 
 
The following paper outlines the latest incarnation of Owen’s (2014) evolving, meta-
theoretical, Genetic-Social framework, and the intention is to illustrate the explanatory 
potential of the sensitizing device, in particular meta-constructs such as the biological 
variable (the evidence from behavioural genetics for an, at least in part, biological 
influence upon human behaviour), psychobiography (the unique, asocial, inherited 
aspects of the person such as disposition), and neuro-agency (a new term which 
acknowledges the influence of neurons upon human ‘free-will’), in the task of 
conceptualising cyber violence. In what follows, cyber violence is reconceptualised, 
moving the definition beyond the usual notion of gendered online violence towards a 
broader conception which incorporates hate trolling, cyber-terrorism, predatory online 
sexual ‘grooming’ and so on. It is the contention here that the synthesis ‘applied’ to 
cyber violence via flexible causal prediction may be of use to criminological theorists, 
social policy-makers and practitioners working in the field of the criminal justice in the 
task of constructing predictive models of cyber violence. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In what follows, an updated version of Owen’s (2014) Genetic-Social, meta-theoretical 
framework which has been employed in over 20 publications is briefly outlined and certain 
meta-constructs are ‘applied’ to the study of online violence. On September 24th 2015, the 
International Telecommunications Union, an agency of the United Nations, published a report 
on ‘Cyber Violence Against Women and Girls: A World-Wide Wake-Up Call’. The report, 
which at the time of writing (November, 2015) has been formally retracted, appeared to 
define ‘cyber violence’ in terms of ‘online trolling’ and ‘online hate-speech’ targeted at 
women and girls. It is contended here that we need to conceptualise ‘cyber violence’ in 
broader terms. Cyber violence can be regarded as behaviour by an actor which takes place 
online and which is hostile and aggressive, and which may also be offensive, indecent, 
obscene, or of a menacing character. The victims can be of any background with regard to 
age, gender, ethnicity, sexuality or social class. Such cyber violence  can be found within both 
the ‘known’ parts of cyberspace-  the social media sites, forums, chat rooms and ‘normal’ 
webpages indexed by conventional search engines, and the ‘dark net’, which ‘has come to 
mean the encrypted world of Tor Hidden Services’, where users cannot be traced, and cannot 
be identified’ (Bartlett, 2015:3). The intention here is to illustrate the explanatory potential of 
the framework, in particular meta-constructs such as the Biological Variable and 
Psychobiography, in conceptualising cyber violence, and to construct an ontologically-
flexible model of cyber violence which may be of help in predicting such behaviour. The 
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term, the Biological Variable refers to the evidence from behavioural genetics and 
neuroscience for an, at least in part, biological basis for some human behaviour. 
Psychobiography refers to the unique, asocial aspects of the person such as inherited 
disposition. Another particular meta-construct from the framework plays a key role here and 
that is the notion of Neuro-Agency.  This term is employed in preference to the standard term 
‘agency’ in order to acknowledge the role of neurons in human free-will. In the course of 
examining cyber-violence through the Genetic-Social lens of the Biological Variable and 
inherited Psychobiography, we consider evidence from Tiihonen et al (2014) for the role of  
CD H13 and MAO-A genes in violent behaviour; evidence for the role of disinhibition in 
violence from Suler (2004) and Spiegel et al (2009); evidence for the role of anti-social 
personality disorder and de-individuation in violence from Bishop (2013) and Buckels et al 
(2014); evidence for the role of cortisol in aggression from Martin (1997); and evidence for 
links between an under-developed prefrontal cortex in teenagers with impulsivity which may 
be linked to violence in the work of Eagleman (2011). The approach employed here is 
interdisciplinary in the sense that the conceptual toolkit draws upon criminological theory, 
sociological theory, the philosophy of Heidegger, behavioural genetics, the neuroscience of 
free-will and evolutionary psychology. This post-Postmodern, ontologically-flexible 
framework represents an attempt to ‘build bridges’ between the biological and social sciences 
and suggests a way in which criminological theory might move beyond its four main 
theoretical obstacles. It is contended here that interdisciplinary research and collaboration 
which seeks to ‘build bridges’ between the biological and social sciences is of great benefit to 
the development of Realist, post-Postmodern criminologies and ‘aspects of our intellectual 
life that are complicit in the stagnation of critical criminology’ (Owen, 2014: 4). 
As Owen (2014:1) suggests, ‘these obstacles are the nihilistic relativism of the 
postmodern and poststructuralist cultural turn; the oversocialised gaze and harshly 
environmentalist conceptions of the person; genetic fatalism or the equation of genetic 
predisposition with inevitability (Owen, 2009, 2012) and bio-phobia (Freese et al, 2003), that 
appear to dominate mainstream criminology; and the sociological weaknesses of many so-
called biosocial explanations of crime and criminal behaviour ( see, for example, Walsh and 
Beaver, 2009; Walsh and Ellis, 2003), which, although dealing adequately with biological 
variables, appear to neglect or make insufficient use of meta-concepts such as agency-
structure, micro-macro and time-space in their accounts of the person. The term, Genetic-
Social is adopted in order to further distance the framework from hardline Sociobiology , and 
to reflect a hopefully more up to date and balanced account of the mutuality and plasticity 
between the biological and the social. 
The beginnings of the Genetic-Social framework lie in Owen’s (2006, 2007a, 2007b) 
earlier attempts to expand Sibeon’s (2004) anti-reductionist framework from a focus upon 
agency-structure, micro-macro and time-space to include a ‘new’ focus upon biological 
variables, reflecting his interest in behavioural genetics. This has led to the current incarnation 
of the framework and the addition over time of ten ‘new’ meta-constructs, applied to the study 
of human biotechnology (Owen, 2009), crime and criminal behaviour (Owen, 2007b, 2012, 
2014). In what follows, we briefly examine the sensitizing device. 
 
Genetic-Social Framework 
 
The Genetic-Social framework arises out of a critique of the following ‘cardinal sins’ of 
illegitimate theoretical reasoning: 
 
1) Reductionism. Reductionist theories are ones which attempt to reduce the complexities of 
social life to a single, unifying principle of explanation or analytical prime mover such as ‘the 
interests of capitalism’, ‘patriarchy’, ‘rational choice’, ‘the risk society’, ‘globalization’ and 
so on. 
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2) Essentialism. Essentialism is a form of theorising that in aprioristic fashion presupposes a 
unity or homogeneity of social phenomena. This can include social institutions, or taxonomic 
collectivities such as ‘white men’, ‘the middle class’ etc. 
 
3) Reification. Reification is the illicit attribution of agency to entities that are not actors or 
agents. An actor is entity possessing cognition that, in principle, has the means of 
formulating, taking and acting upon decisions. Therefore, ‘the state’, ‘society’, ‘white people’ 
etc are not regarded as actors. 
 
4) Functional Teleology. Functional teleology is an invalid form of analysis involving 
attempts to explain the causes of social phenomena in terms of their effects, where ‘effects’ 
refers to outcomes or consequences viewed as performances of functions. If there is no 
evidence of intentional planning by actors ‘somewhere, sometime’, then it is a teleological 
fallacy to engage in explication of the causes of phenomena in terms of their effects, for 
example the concept of ‘institutional racism’ drawn upon in the MacPherson Report into the 
death of Stephen Lawrence (Owen, 2014). 
 
5) Relativism. Relativism is a philosophical stance associated with Poststructuralism 
(Foucault, 1980a, 1980b) and Post-modernism (Lyotard, 1984). Arguably, relativists reject 
foundationalism from which theories can be generated, and fail to provide acceptable 
epistemologies and viable theories. The most basic criticism of Foucault’s relativistic position 
is that he never applies it to himself, to his own theories and conceptual frameworks. Foucault 
is open, that is to say, to the self-referential objection which posits that, if all theories are the 
product of a particular situation, then so too is that theory, and it therefore has no universal 
validity. To put it another way, if truth and falsity do not exist in an absolute sense, then 
Foucault’s thesis about the relativity of all knowledge cannot be ‘true’ in this sense. In 
arguing the way he does, Foucault is surely employing the very criteria of truth and validity 
which he claims are culturally relative. He is, in a sense, employing reason to try to prove the 
inadequacy of reason; claiming to provide a universally valid and ‘true’ explanation of why 
there is no such thing as a universally valid and ‘true’ explanation. Put simply, the 
Poststructuralist and Postmodern statement that there can be no general theory, is itself a 
general theory (Owen, 2009, 2012, 2014). 
 
6) The Oversocialized Gaze. The meta-concept of the oversocialised gaze refers to harshly 
‘environmentalist’ accounts which are characterised by a strong antipathy towards genetic, or 
partially genetic explication. Examples include Foucauldian arguments to the ends that 
sexuality is a ‘learned script’ (Owen, 2014). 
 
7) Genetic Fatalism. Genetic Fatalism refers to a widespread tendency within social science 
to equate genetic determinism with inevitability. Arguably, it is a mistake to view the genes 
involved in human behaviour as immutable. Genes can be ‘switched on’, and external events- 
or free-willed behaviour- can ‘switch on’ genes (Owen, 2009). 
 
8) Emotive Aversion. Emotive aversion refers to a tendency, especially prevalent within the 
left/liberal consensus that dominates UK-based Criminology, towards emotionally-charged, 
knee-jerk ‘yuk reactions’ to ‘controversial’ subjects ranging from the bio-phobia of reactions 
against attempts to marry genes and environment to cloning (Owen, 2009). 
 
9) Incantatory Language. The metatheoretical framework can be said to be anti-
incantatory in the spirit of Alain Robbe-Grillet (1963) and to some extent Heidegger (2010) 
in the sense of a ‘theory of pure surface’ and repugnance felt towards visceral, analogical and 
incantatory language of the sort which often characterises theories of hegemony, the idea of 
‘the state as crimogenic’ and so on (Owen and Owen, 2015). 
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In addition to these ‘cardinal sins’, the ‘sensitizing device’ focuses upon the following 
metatheoretical formulations or meta-concepts: 
 
1) Agency-Structure.The framework utilises a non-reifed conception of agency, in which 
actors or agents are defined as entities that are, in principle, capable of formulating and acting 
upon decisions. Structure refers to the ‘social conditions’, or the circumstances in which 
actors operate, including the resources that actors may draw upon. Structure, then, may refer 
to discourses, institutions, social practices and individual/social actors.  However, the new 
term Neuro-Agency (Owen and Owen, 2015) is now favoured over the earlier Agency. This 
is to acknowledge the work of those such as Dennett (1981) and Dennett et al (2007) whose 
Compatibilist/Soft Determinist work strongly supports the notion of the neuroscience of free-
will. The framework adopts an adaptionist, Neural Darwinist approach to human agency 
which posits that morality evolved. 
 
2) Micro-Macro. This meta-construct refers to the units of and scale of analyses concerned 
with the investigation of varying extensions of time-space. Micro and Macro should be 
viewed a distinct and autonomous levels of social process.  
 
3) Time-Space. Time-space refers to significant but neglected dimensions of the social, and 
reflects concerns with temporality and spatiality. Classical social theorists such as Durkheim 
have tended to regard time as ‘social time’, distinct from a ‘natural essence’. However, the 
question of how differing time-frames-including those associated with the macro-social order 
and those with the micro-social-interweave is a complex matter that relates to debates 
pertaining to dualism versus duality. 
 
4) Power. The framework acknowledges the multiple nature of power. Power exists in more 
than one form, in particular, there are objective structural (including systemic) forms of 
power, and agentic power. The latter term refers to the partly systemic and partly relational 
and potentially variable capacity of agents to shape events in a preferred direction. This is a 
modified notion of Foucauldian power, which recognises the dialectical relationship between 
agentic and systemic forms of power; the relational, contingent and emergent dimensions of 
power, and the concept that, contra Foucault, aspects of power can be ‘stored’ in 
positions/roles (i.e, that of a judge or police officer) and as social systems/networks (Owen, 
2014). 
 
5) Dualism. The framework favours dualism rather than notions of duality of structure. 
Foucault’s work, for example, has a tendency to compact agency and structure together 
instead of treating them as dualisms. This Foucauldian tendency collapses distinctions 
between the two resulting in central conflation. Here it is recommended that agency and 
structure and biology and the social should be employed as dualisms that refer to distinct, 
relatively autonomous phenomena.That is not to deny the mutuality and plasticity between the 
biological and social realms but rather to acknowledge that there may be times when we wish 
to study each sphere of influence separately (Owen, 2014). 
 
6) Intermittent Gewissen. This Heideggerian term refers to the idea that ‘the call of 
conscience’ is intermittent. 
 
7) The Biological Variable. The meta-construct refers to the evidence from evolutionary 
psychology, neuroscience and behavioural genetics for an, at least in part, biological basis for 
some human behaviour. For example, sexuality, language acquisition, reactions to stress and 
so on. Here, we should keep the notion of ‘nature via nurture’ firmly in mind. This refers to 
the ‘feedback loop’ which embraces both genes and environment, acknowledging plasticity 
and mutuality. Genes predetermine the broad structure of the brain of Homo Sapiens, but they 
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also absorb formative experiences and react to social cues (Owen, 2006, 2009, 2012, 2014). 
Recent cogent work by Tiihonen et al (2014) pertaining to links between severe violent, 
criminal behaviour and MAOA and CD H13 genotypes in a chort of Finnish prisoners is a 
possible ‘biological variable’ within multifactorial analysis. 
 
8) Psychobiography. The meta-construct was originally coined by Derek Layder to refer to 
the largely unique, asocial components of an individual’s dispositions, behaviour, and self-
identity, these being aspects of the individual that are relatively independent of face-to-face 
interaction and the macro-social sphere. In his foreword to Owen’s (2009) Social Theory and 
Human Biotechnology, Layder states that, ‘I fully concur with Owen’s ‘extension’ of the 
implications of the notions of psychobiography to embrace the mutuality and plasticity of the 
relations between genetic and environmental influences’. 
 
9) Dasein. From Heidegger, meaning being-there, human being, being human. Heidegger 
uses ‘Dasein’ to refer both to the concrete human being and to its (abstract) being human. The 
term is employed in the framework usually to refer to an entity, the human being. 
 
10) Neuroplasticity. The term is from neuroscience and refers to the concept that life 
experiences reorganise the human brain. 
 
11) Embodied Cognition. This is another concept from neuroscience which conceives of the 
human mind as the product of the brain, the body and interactions in the outside world. 
 
12) Product. The concept that behaviour requires an actor ‘acting’ in an environment, and 
that the actor is the product of the genes, which are influenced by external events and Neuro-
Agency absorbing formative experiences, and which ‘build’ the nervous system integrated 
within the actor productive of behaviour. 
 
  In what follows, we examine some selected examples of theoretical explanations for forms 
of cyber-violence from Suler (2004), Bishop (2013) and Buckels et al (2014) in addition to 
some selected explanations for aggression (Martin, 1997; Tiihonen et al, 2014) and 
impulsivity (Eagleman, 2011), which are here deemed relevant to the task of conceptualising 
forms of cyber violence,  and we consider the possibility of synthesising some of the insights 
from these diverse explanations with meta-concepts from the Genetic-Social framework in a 
cautious attempt to point a possible ‘way forward’ towards a predictive model of cyber 
violence. The task here is to prepare the ground for further meta-theoretical and empirical 
investigation based upon large-scale synthesis involving models of flexible causality and 
flexible ontology. 
 
Forms of Cyber Violence and Some Possible Explanations 
 
The psychologist, John Suler (2004) studied the behaviour of participants in online chatrooms 
noting that participants tended to display greater anger and aggression in cyberspace than they 
did offline. He argued that this was because, ‘when protected by a screen, people feel that 
real-world social restrictions, responsibilities and norms don’t apply’ (Bartlett, 2015: 8). 
Whether real or imagined, anonymity may allow people to explore their identities but it also 
may ‘allow’ them to act without fear of being held to account for their behaviour in a realm 
where responsibilities, norms and social restrictions may not apply. Suler called this, ‘The 
Online Disinhibition Effect’. He examined six factors ‘that interact with each other in creating 
this online disinhibition effect’, which are dissociative anonymity, invisibility, asynchronicity, 
solipsistic introjection, dissociative imagination and minimisation of authority (ibid: 
Abstract). Suler chose not to conceptualise disinhibition as the revealing of, ‘an underlying 
‘true self’, but rather as, ‘a shift to a constellation within self-structure involving clusters of 
affect and cognition that differ from the in-person constellation’ (ibid). This disinhibition 
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effect may manifest itself as ‘toxic disinhibition’ in situations where people, ‘visit the dark 
underworld of the Internet- places of pornography, crime, and violence- territory they would 
never explore in the real world’ (ibid: Abstract). Interestingly, there is some evidence for a 
link between disinhibition and a disruption of the orbitofrontal circuit, which according to 
Spiegel et al (2009) has been treated successfully with carbamazepine. 
Buckels et al (2014: Abstract) recently examined trolling and found that there were, 
‘overall strong positive associations emerged among online commenting frequency, trolling 
engagement, and troll identity, pointing to a common construct underlying the measures’, and 
that both of their studies, ‘revealed similar patterns of relations between trolling and the Dark 
Tetrad of Personality: trolling correlated positively with sadism, psychopathy and 
Machiavellianism’. Trolling has, according to Bartlett (2014: 20), become, ‘shorthand for any 
nasty or threatening behaviour online’. With this is mind, it is interesting to read Bishop’s 
(2013) recent work on the de-individuation of the internet troller, and his ‘interview with a 
Hater’. Bishop (ibid: Abstract) suggests that the interview, ‘makes it apparent that there are a 
number of similarities between the proposed anti-social personality disorder in DSM-V and 
flame-trolling activity’. Bishop (2013: 29) identifies deindividuation, ‘a psychological state 
where inner restraints are lost when individuals are not seen or paid attention to as 
individuals’, as part of the depersonalization and decreased sense of self-identity, self-
awareness, and self-control in ‘Hater’ trolls. Bishop (ibid: 46) usefully constructs a ‘Trolling 
Magnitude Scale’, suggesting that if such instruments are adopted, ‘it will make it easier for 
the police and other law enforcement authorities to prioritise who is prosecuted in an 
objective way’. He makes a cogent point when arguing that the law enforcement agencies, 
‘need to get a grip, and take action against flame-trollers only when set thresholds are met and 
not in response to media-led public opinion’ (ibid). As Bishop also correctly suggests, an 
important step following the identification of which examples of trolling are ‘offensive’ is 
‘trying to understand why some of the most prolific trollers act the way they do’ (ibid: 45). 
Clearly, in relation to the particular ‘Hate’ troller interviewed by Bishop, there is evidence 
provided on nearly every criteria of DSM-V ‘to support the claim that the psychopathy of 
Internet trollers resembles those with personality disorders’ (Bishop, 2013: 45). The author 
goes on to ponder whether ‘Haters’ have average abilities, and whether their resentment of 
‘those who excel from being Hi-Functioning Empathics or Hi-Functioning Autistics’ results 
from their ‘wanting to be the best at everything and instead being the best at nothing’ (ibid: 
46). In other words, these neurotic and psychotic symptoms could be, ‘an outcome of a failure 
to choose between excelling in life as an empathic, or indeed as an autistic’ (ibid). This, in 
Bishop’s view, is not the ‘fault’ of the ‘Hater’ but rather the result of the historically unique, 
high demands placed upon people in 21st century society. A long-term solution, Bishop (ibid) 
ponders, is perhaps for neuroscientists to, ‘force the evolution of the brain’. There may be 
times when it is an advantage to be empathic, such as when socialising, and times when it is 
an advantage to be autistic, such as when engaged in studying.  
These examples of explanations for aspects of cyber violence, rooted in psychology, 
can arguably be synthesised with examples of the biological variable favoured as a meta-
concept in the Genetic-Social, metatheoretical framework. For example, Bishop’s (2013) 
work which, as we have seen above, usefully links ‘Hate’ trolling with DSM-V, includes 
impulsivity as a notable characteristic of such offline offenders. There is convincing evidence 
from Eagleman (2011) for a link between impusivity in teenagers and under-development of 
the pre-frontal cortex of the brain. Not all ‘Hate’ trollers are teenagers, and indeed Bartlett 
(2014) provides examples of prolific offenders who are much older, but a sizeable proportion 
of trollers are teenagers. It may be possible to include the biological variable of an, at least in 
part, neurological explanation for the impulsive behaviour displayed by some teenage trolls. 
As Eagleman (2011: 122) puts it, ‘the human prefrontal cortex does not fully develop until the 
early 20s, and this fact underlies the impulsive behaviour of teenagers’. 
Additionally, it may be possible to link the psychologically-based observations of 
those such as Suler (2004), Buckels et al (2014), and Bishop (2013) in relation to cyber 
violence with further examples of the biological variable; that of the recent work on MAO-A 
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and CD H13 genes linked to aggression in the work of Tiihonen et al (2015). Links between 
the first gene, MAO-A and aggression first came to attention in 1993 via the study of a family 
in the Netherlands in which the men were, ‘inclined to violently deviant behaviour, such as 
impulsive aggression, arson, attempted rape and exhibitionism’ (Wade, 2014: 55). The eight 
men concerned carried an unusual form of the MAO-A gene in which a single mutation 
causes the cell’s assembly of the MAO-A enzyme to be stopped halfway through, making it 
ineffective. As a result of this absence of functioning MAO-A enzymes, neurotransmitters 
grow in excess, which is linked to overaggression in social contexts (Anholt and Mackay, 
2012). 
Tiihonen et al’s (2015: Abstract) more recent work covers both MAO-A and CD H13 
genotypes in a group of Finnish prisoners and cogently suggests that in the developed 
countries, ‘the majority of all violent crime is committed by a small group of antisocial 
recidivistic offenders’, but until recently ‘no genes have been shown to contribute to 
recidivistic violent offending or severe violent behaviour such as homicide’. However, the 
results of Tiihonen et al’s study of two independent cohorts of Finnish prisoners, ‘revealed 
that a monoamine oxidase A (MAO-A) low-activity genotype (contributing to low dopamine 
turnover rate) as well as the CD H13 gene (coding for neural membrane adhesion proteins) 
are associated with extremely violent behaviour (at least 10 committed homicides, attempted 
homicides or battery)’ (ibid). Tiihonen and colleagues found that, ‘no substantial signal was 
observed for either MAO-A or CD H13 among non-violent offenders, indicating that findings 
were specific for violent offending, and not attributable to substance abuse or antisocial 
personality disorder’ (ibid). For the researchers, these results indicate ‘both low monoamine 
metabolism and neuronal membrane dysfunction as plausible factors in the etiology of 
extreme criminal violent behaviour’ (ibid). It is argued here that it may be possible to include 
MAO-A and CD H13 genotypes as biological variables in metatheoretical analysis of cyber 
violence drawing upon flexible ontology and multifactorial explanations. Tiihonen’s study 
does not venture into cyberspace as an arena for criminality but it is possible that some 
offenders engaging in extreme examples of cyber violence, such as ‘Hate’ trolling, cyber-
bullying and cyber-terrorism (such as attempts by ISIS’s hackers to attack key targets in 
increasingly interconnected western cities and thus potentially bringing them to a standstill) 
may indeed carry such genotypes.  
The Genetic-Social framework employed here posits that ‘nurture’ depends upon 
genes, and genes require ‘nurture’. To reiterate, genes predetermine the broad structure of the 
brain of Homo Sapiens, absorb formative experiences, react to social cues and can be 
‘switched-on’ by agentic behaviour and environmental stimuli. For example, stress can be 
caused by the outside world, by impending events, by bereavements and so on. Short-term 
stressors, ‘cause an immediate reaction in the production of norepinephrine and epinephrine 
hormones responsible for increasing the heartbeat and preparing the human body for ‘fight or 
flight’ in emergency situations’ (Owen, 2014: 2-3). Stressors that have a longer duration may 
activate a pathway that results in a slower but more persistent increase in cortisol. Cortisol can 
suppress the working of the immune system. Thus, those who have shown symptoms of stress 
are more likely to catch infections because an effect of cortisol is to reduce the activity and 
number of white blood cells or lymphocytes (Becker et al, 1992). As Martin (1997) shows, 
cortisol does this by switching on genes, and it only switches on genes in cells that possess 
cortisol receptors, which have in turn been switched on by environmental stimuli, such as 
stress caused by bereavement. Cortisol is secreted in the first place because a series of genes 
such as CYP17 get switched on in the adrenal cortex to produce the enzymes necessary for 
making cortisol. There are some very important implications here which inform the attempts 
to construct Genetic-Social conceptualisations and explanations of cyber violence. For 
example, Filley et al (2001) have linked elevated levels of norepinephrine with aggressive 
criminal behaviour. Hostile behaviour can be induced in humans by increasing plasma levels 
of norepinephrine, whereas agents that block norepinephrine receptor cells can reduce violent 
behaviour (ibid). Again, the biological variable, in this case, the role of cortisol levels in 
violent criminal behaviour may be drawn upon in multifactorial, metatheoretical theorising in 
International Journal of Criminology and Sociological Theory, Vol. 9, No. 1, August 2016, 1-11. 
 
 
8 
 
relation to cyber violence. It is certainly possible that the behaviour of some offenders is, at 
least in part, related to cortisol levels. 
The Genetic-Social approach to cyber violence acknowledges that crime may be 
socially-constructed in the sense that, ‘human actors ascribe meaning to the world, but that 
there is still a reality ‘out there’, in the sense that environmental conditions are potential 
triggers of genetic or physiological predispositions towards behaviour that may be labelled 
criminal’ (Owen, 2014: 3). However, that does not mean that behaviour should be viewed as 
reflecting an inherited, pre-written script that is beyond individual control. The hardline 
neural determinism of Eagleman (2011) in which there appears to be a rejection of the notion 
of free-will is challenged here. The Genetic-Social framework utilises the term Neuro-Agency 
to acknowledge the influence of neurons upon human agency but further research will have to 
be conducted before there can be any abandonment of the idea that human beings are 
reflexive agents who, ‘possess the agency to choose not to engage in criminal activities where 
they believe that their actions will harm others and offend ethico-social codes, or where the 
rewards are outweighed by negative consequences (Owen, 2014: 3). Agency, in turn, is 
influenced not only by morality or reason but also by inherited, constitutional variables. An 
inherited, impulsive disposition whether the result of an under-developed prefrontal cortex 
(Eagleman, 2011), anti-social personality disorder (Bishop, 2013), or a reflection of unique, 
asocial psychiobiography which may not ‘fit’ any existing typology (Owen, 2014), may 
predispose an actor to formulate and act upon potentially criminal decisions. In Genetic-
Social theorising, notions of the biological variable and unique psychobiography must be 
considered as one element within multifactorial explanations of crime and criminal behaviour 
alongside a critique of neuro-agency and structure, time-space, modified notions of 
Foucauldian power  and other meta-concepts codified earlier. To recap, behaviour such as 
cyber violence requires an actor ‘acting’ in an environment, in this case cyberspace. The actor 
can be conceptualised as the product of the genes, which are impacted upon by external 
events, neuro-agency, and absorb formative experiences, required to ‘build’ the nervous 
system integrated within. An actor may be also conceptualised as a conscious, sentient being 
capable of formulating and acting upon decisions. As Owen and Owen (2015) recently made 
clear, this definition is at odds with the reified accounts of agency favoured in Posthuman 
Agency theories and Actor-Network theories. The Genetic-Social framework draws upon the 
concept of Dasein from Heidegger (2010), which views the human being not as an isolated 
subject removed from the world of objects that it desires knowledge of. For Heidegger, 
humans are beings who are, ‘always already in the world, and in the main we do not 
distinguish ourselves from this world’ (Owen and Owen, 2015: 23). In Heideggerian terms, 
being is time, to be a human being is to exist temporally between birth and death. This idea of 
the human actor as a being capable of contemplating its own finitude is greatly at odds with 
the reified concept of the ‘merged’ hybrid between human actor and technology favoured in 
Brown’s (2013) concept of   Virtual Criminology.  The actor, in this case, an offender 
engaged in criminal cyber violence, has embodied cognition, that is to say the mind is the 
product of the dynamic interaction between the brain, the body and external influences in the 
world. Again, there is a link here to the ideas of Heidegger in the sense that the criminal 
offender experiences the world by interacting with it, and in this criminal context that may 
involve engaging in threatening, offensive or terrifying behaviour, and that thinking involves 
putting things to ‘use’.    
 
Building a Possibly Predictive Model of Cyber Violence 
 
To recap, the Genetic-Social metatheoretical framework draws upon notions of multifactorial 
analysis, a flexible Realist ontology, and notions of flexible causality, rejecting reductionist, 
unitary explanations. It is contended here that it may be possible to utilise the framework in 
an attempt to build a possibly predictive model of cyber violence. Cyber violence, as has 
hopefully been made clear, is regarded here as online behaviour on the part of an actor which 
is situated either on conventional social media sites or the dark net and which is hostile and 
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aggressive, and may also be offensive, obscene, indecent or of a menacing character. This 
may include phenomena such as ‘Hate’ trolling, online ‘grooming’ and sexual predation, 
cyber terrorism and so on. It is argued here that we need to expand the rather narrow 
definition of cyber violence favoured by the International Telecommunications Union (2015) 
to span a wider spectrum of behaviour which includes the aforementioned phenomena 
alongside violence which is specifically aimed at women and girls. As we have seen 
previously, the metatheoretical framework arises out of a critique of the following illicit forms 
of theoretical reasoning; reductionism, reification, essentialism, functional teleology, emotive 
aversion, incantatory language, the oversocialised gaze, relativism, and genetic fatalism.  
As we have also seen earlier, the framework draws upon notions of the biological 
variable and psychobiography in metatheoretical analysis. In this context, we may regard the 
biological variable as including the evidence for a role for cortisol in aggression (Martin, 
1997), the role of an under-developed pre-frontal cortex in teenagers in impulsivity 
(Eagleman, 2011), and the role of CD H13 and MAO-A genotypes in aggression (Tiihonen et 
al, 2014). Psychobiography refers to unique, asocial aspects of the person such as disposition, 
and in some cases, this behaviour may not ‘fit’ neatly into existing typologies of behaviour. In 
other cases, the unique criminal behaviour may be combined with patterns of behaviour that 
are typical of the subgroup to which the offender belongs. Included under the dispositional 
umbrella of psychobiography, are the Machiavellianism, sadism and psychopathy identified 
by Buckels et al (2014), the ant-social personality disorders identified by Bishop (2013). 
These elements are possible causal variables that we might combine with Suler’s (2004) 
online disinhibition effect, and notions of time-space, micro-macro and neuro-agency-
structure in multifactorial analysis. Owen and Noble (2015) recently employed Noble’s 
notion of Causal Probability in an attempt to ‘apply’ Owen’s notion of flexible ontology and 
multifactorial analysis to issues around conflict. Here it is contended that Owen’s meta-
concept of Flexible Causal Prediction (FCP) is employed in conceptualising cyber violence 
as it might more accurately describe the ant-reductionist approach of Genetic-Social 
theorising. If we were to employ a Genetic-Social approach to cyber violence we would need 
to keep firmly in mind that the metatheoretical framework which informs it relies upon an 
anti-reductionist approach which rejects simplistic, unitary explanations for complex 
phenomena. We are employing meta-theory here, which is primarily concerned with 
ontological questions and reliant upon methodological generalisations.  The intention is to 
inform and possibly improve the construction of substantive theory and the design of 
empirical field research. In using Flexible Causal Prediction or FCP, the researcher using the 
framework would be able to gain a picture of the most likely combination of variables in an 
explanation of the cyber violence of an individual offender. Here, the intention is to 
cautiously point a possible way forward which might inform the approaches of those who 
seek to conceptualise and possibly combat cyber violence. 
 
Concluding Observations 
 
It is the contention here that we need to widen the definition of cyber violence to include a 
much broader spectrum of hostile and aggressive behaviour in cyber space. As has been 
hopefully demonstrated here, it may be possible to arrive at a predictive model of cyber 
violence if we draw upon the multifactorial analysis favoured in the Genetic-Social 
metatheoretical framework, avoiding the ‘cardinal sins’ of illicit theoretical reasoning, 
drawing upon the array of meta-concepts outlined above in the manner of a ‘toolkit’, and 
applying the meta-concepts via a Realist approach which relies upon FCP or Flexible Causal 
Prediction. This synthesis may be of use to criminological theorists, makers of social policy 
and practitioners in the field of criminal justice. To reiterate, Genetic-Social meta-theorising 
serves to prepare the ground for further theoretical and empirical investigation and this entails 
large-scale synthesis. 
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